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Abstract
We design a jamming-resistant receiver scheme to enhance the robustness of a massive MIMO
uplink system against jamming. We assume that a jammer attacks the system both in the pilot and data
transmission phases. The key feature of the proposed scheme is that, in the pilot phase, we estimate
not only the legitimate channel, but also the jamming channel by exploiting a purposely unused pilot
sequence. The jamming channel estimate is used to constructed linear receive filters that reject the
impact of the jamming signal. The performance of the proposed scheme is analytically evaluated using
asymptotic properties of massive MIMO. The optimal regularized zero-forcing receiver and the optimal
power allocation are also studied. Numerical results are provided to verify our analysis and show that
the proposed scheme greatly improves the achievable rates, as compared to conventional receivers.
Interestingly, the proposed scheme works particularly well under strong jamming attacks, since the
improved estimate of the jamming channel outweighs the extra jamming power.
Index Terms
Massive MIMO, jamming attack, receive filter, optimal power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a promising candidate for the emerging 5G wireless communication networks [2], massive
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) has recently received a lot of research attention. However,
This work will be partly presented at the 42nd IEEE Int. Conf. on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Process. (ICASSP2017),
Mar. 5-9, 2017, New Orleans, USA [1].
2the physical layer security of massive MIMO is not well studied in literature. A potential reason
is the belief that physical layer security techniques in regular MIMO systems, which have been
intensively studied, can be straight-forwardly extended to massive MIMO systems. However, as
shown in [3, 4], the spatial dimensions that massive MIMO exploits bring new challenges and
opportunities to the physical layer security, which are fundamentally different from conventional
MIMO systems. While massive MIMO is robust against passive eavesdropping [3] thanks to
the array gain and ability to operate with lower transmit power, active jamming attacks is a big
challenge. When a massive MIMO system is attacked by jamming, especially in the pilot phase,
the additional pilot contamination caused by the jamming leads to an inability to suppress the
jamming and this translates into a significant reduction of the achievable rates [4].
Although jamming exists and has been identified as a critical problem for reliable communica-
tions [5, 6], there are only a few works focusing on the jamming aspects in massive MIMO [3, 4,
7–10]. For instance, optimized jamming is studied for uplink massive MIMO in [9], which shows
that a smart jammer can cause substantial jamming pilot contamination that degrades the sum
rate. In order to detect pilot contamination attacks in massive MIMO, several jamming detection
techniques are introduced in [3, 7, 9]. Jamming defense mechanisms for massive MIMO are
proposed in [4, 7], in which secret keys are employed to encrypt and protect the legitimate signal
from jamming attacks. The authors of [10] investigates an artificial noise-aided transmitter for
secure communications in the presence of attackers capable of both jamming and eavesdropping.
Pilot contamination appears when the pilot signal, transmitted for estimation of a user channel,
is interfered by another transmission [11]. The typical effect is that the base station (BS) cannot
use the estimated channel to coherently combine the desired signal, without also coherently
combining the interference. Pilot contamination between legitimate users of the system is a big
challenge in massive MIMO, but can be substantially suppressed by pilot coordination across cells
[12, 13] or by exploiting second-order channel statistics [14, 15]. Jamming pilot contamination
is more difficult to deal with, because the jammer refuses to coordinate itself with the system
and attempts to create maximum pilot contamination rather than minimum. Since the knowledge
of the structure and properties of the jamming attack is limited, a typical approach to deal with
jamming signals is to treat them as additive noise and design the transceivers as if there was
3no jamming [4, 9]. However, jamming in massive MIMO is not noise-like since the legitimate
channel estimate is correlated with the jamming channel.
In order to enhance the robustness of the massive MIMO uplink against jamming attacks,
we consider an anti-jamming scheme based on jamming-resistant receivers, which is briefly
introduced in [1]. Developed from our initial concept in [1], this paper provides a comprehensive
study of jamming-resistant receiver design for the massive MIMO uplink by including various
rigorous proofs and new results related to the effect of jamming powers, optimal receive filters,
and power allocations.
The key idea of the proposed scheme is to construct the receive filters using not only an
estimate of the legitimate channel but also an estimate of the jamming channel. To this end, we
exploit a purposely unused pilot sequence, which is orthogonal to the pilot sequences assigned
to the legitimate user, to estimate the jamming channel, up to an unknown scaling factor. This
estimate is used to design receive filters that reject the jamming signal. We consider regularized
zero-forcing (RZF) receive filters, in which the regularization factor can be adjusted to optimize
the system performance.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, the achievable rates are analyzed and
closed-form large-scale approximations are obtained. Based on the analytical results, we derive
the optimal regularization factor for the RZF receiver. Moreover, we study how a legitimate
user should allocate its power between the pilot and data phases. We obtain an asymptotically
optimal power allocation for systems with a very large number of antennas and a sub-optimal
power allocation for cases with a finite number of antennas. Simulation results are provided,
which reveal that the proposed jamming-resistant receivers and power allocation substantially
improve the system performance over conventional schemes.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the problem setup and signal
models for the pilot and data transmission phases. Section III considers the channel estimations
and jamming-resistant receiver design. In Section IV, closed-form large-scale approximations
for the achievable rates of the proposed scheme are provided. The optimal RZF receiver and
effects of the jamming powers are also analyzed in this section. Section V studies the optimal
power allocation. Numerical results are then provided in Section VI and the main conclusions
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Fig. 1. Massive MIMO uplink under a jamming attack.
are given in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider a single-user massive MIMO uplink consisting of a BS, a legitimate user and a
jammer, as depicted in Fig. 1. We assume that the BS is equipped with M antennas, while the
legitimate user and the jammer have a single antenna each. This basic model captures the main
principle of jamming, and the methodology can be generalized to having multiple legitimate
users.
Let us denote h ∈ CM×1 and g ∈ CM×1 as the channel vectors from the legitimate user
and the jammer to the BS, respectively. We assume that the elements of h are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian (ZMCSCG)
random variables, i.e., h ∼ CN (0, βuIM), where the variance βu represents the large-scale fading.
Similarly, we assume that g ∼ CN (0, βjIM), where the variance βj represents the large-scale
fading. The channels h and g are independent.
We consider a block-fading model, in which the channel remains constant during a coher-
ence block of T symbols, and varies independently from one coherence block to the next.
The communication between the legitimate user and the BS follows a two-phase transmission
protocol. In the first phase (pilot phase), the legitimate user sends a pilot sequence to the BS for
channel estimation. In the second phase (data transmission phase), the legitimate user transmits
5its payload data to the BS. We assume that the jammer attacks the system both in the pilot and
data transmission phases.
A. Pilot Phase
During the first τ symbols of a coherence block (τ < T ), the user transmits a pilot sequence su
of length τ symbols. This pilot originates from a pilot codebook S containing τ orthogonal unit-
power vectors. We assume that there is (at least) one pilot sequence that is unused and orthogonal
to pilot sequences assigned to the legitimate user.1 We further assume that the jammer is aware
of the transmission protocol but the legitimate system uses a pilot hopping scheme such that
the jammer cannot know the users’ current pilot sequences. Therefore, the jammer randomly
chooses a jamming sequence sj uniformly distributed over the unit sphere. By sending the
jamming sequence sj ∈ Cτ×1, which satisfies ‖sj‖2 = 1, the jammer hopes to interfere with the
channel estimation.
Accordingly, the received signal at the M antennas of the BS in the τ symbol times of the
pilot phase can be stacked as
Yt =
√
τpuhs
T
u +
√
τpjgs
T
j +Nt, (1)
where Yt ∈ CM×τ , pu and pj are the transmit powers per symbol of the user and jammer
during the pilot phase, respectively. The additive noise matrix Nt ∈ CM×τ is assumed to have
i.i.d. ZMCSCG elements, i.e., vec(Nt) ∼ CN (0, σ2IM2τ2), where σ2 is the noise variance and
vec(Nt) is the vectorization of Nt.
B. Data Transmission Phase
During the last (T − τ) symbols of a coherence block, the user transmits payload data to the
BS and the jammer continues to interfere by sending a jamming signal. Let us denote as xu
1This is often the case in real systems, when the system is dimensioned for a maximum simultaneous user load that is
substantially larger than the number of active users at most points in time.
6and xj the transmitted signals from the user and the jammer, respectively. These signals satisfy
E{|xu|2} = 1 and E{|xj|2} = 1. The received signal at the BS is
yd =
√
quhxu +
√
qjgxj + nd, (2)
where the additive noise vector nd is assumed to have i.i.d. CN (0, σ2) elements, qu and qj are
the transmit powers from the user and jammer in the data transmission phase, respectively.
To detect xu based on yd, the BS uses a linear receive filter as follows:
y = aHyd =
√
qua
Hhxu +
√
qja
Hgxj + a
Hnd, (3)
where a ∈ CM×1 is the receive filter, which will be carefully selected in the next section to
reject the jamming. The received signal in (3) can be rewritten as
y =
√
quE{aHh|sj}xu +√qu(aHh− E{aHh|sj})xu +√qjaHgxj + aHnd. (4)
By treating
√
quE{aHh|sj} as the deterministic channel that the desired signal is received over
and treating the last three terms (which are uncorrelated with xu) as worst-case independent
Gaussian noise, an achievable rate for the legitimate user in the massive MIMO uplink is
R =
(
1− τ
T
)
Esj {log2 (1 + ρ)} , (5)
where the pre-log factor
(
1− τ
T
)
accounts for the channel estimation overhead and ρ is the
effective signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR), which is given by
ρ =
qu|E{aHh|sj}|2
quvar{aHh|sj}+ qjE{|aHg|2|sj}+ σ2E{‖a‖2|sj} (6)
and var{aHh|sj} = E{|aHh|2|sj} − |E{aHh|sj}|2. In (6), the numerator (qu|E{aHh|sj}|2)
represents the effective desired signal power. The first term (quvar{aHh|sj}), second term
(qjE{|aHg|2|sj}), and third term (σ2E{‖a‖2|sj}) in the denominator of (6) correspond to the
undesired signals’ powers resulted from the channel uncertainty, jamming, and additive noise,
respectively. Typically, due to the channel hardening in massive MIMO, the power terms asso-
ciated with the channel uncertainty and additive noise are negligible compared to the desired
7signal term and the jamming term.2 In order to improve the system performance, one can focus
on selecting the receive filter a such that it amplifies the desired signal (qu|E{aHh|sj}|2 is large),
while mitigating the jamming signal (qjE{|aHg|2|sj} is as small as possible).
Remark 1. We note that the expectations in (6) are with respect to (w.r.t.) h, g, Nt, xu, and xj.
The effective SINR ρ in (6) is conditioned on sj. In order to realize the achievable rate in (5),
the BS needs to know the numerator and the denominator of ρ. Although sj is assumed to be
unknown by the system, we will later show that ρ only depends on the correlations of sj and the
legitimate pilot sequences, which can be estimated with high accuracy thanks to the asymptotic
properties of massive MIMO. We also stress that the receiver processing proposed in the next
section will not exploit any instantaneous knowledge of sj.
III. CHANNEL ESTIMATION AND JAMMING-RESISTANT RECEIVER DESIGN
The achievable rate in (5) highly depends on the choice of the receive filter a. To harvest an
array gain, it should be selected as a function of the received pilot signal in the pilot phase. In
this section, we propose a jamming-resistant receive filter, which is constructed based on not
only the estimate of the legitimate channel but also on an estimate of the jamming channel.
A. Channel Estimation
In order to estimate the legitimate channel h, the received pilot signal Yt is first correlated
with the user’s pilot sequence su as
yu = Yts
∗
u =
√
τpuh+
√
τpjs
T
j s
∗
ug +Nts
∗
u. (7)
Since the BS does not know sTj s
∗
u, but only its distribution (as explained below), the linear
MMSE estimate of h given yt is [16]
ĥ = ηuyt , α1h+ α2g + n1, (8)
2We will later show that the power terms associated with the channel uncertainty and additive noise are proportional to the
number of antennas M , whereas the desired signal term and the jamming term are proportional to M2 when M is large.
8where ηu =
√
τpuβu
τpuβu+pjβj+1
, α1 = ηu
√
τpu, α2 = ηu
√
τpjs
T
j s
∗
u, and n1 ∼ CN (0, η2uσ2IM). In
order to perform the estimation in (8), the BS needs to know pjβj. Since this term contains the
large-scale fading βj, it changes very slowly with time (e.g., some 40 times slower than the
small-scale fading according to [17, 18]). Therefore, the BS can estimate pjβj in advance, e.g.,
the BS can let the user be silent at some random occasions (unknown to the jammer) to measure
the corresponding power level or use blind estimation techniques [18].
As we can see from (8), the legitimate channel estimate ĥ is correlated with the jamming
channel g. Without the knowledge of the jamming channel g, the receive filter a is generally
chosen as a linear function of ĥ. In the absence of jamming, the optimal receive filter is
aMRC = ĥ, (9)
which is known as maximal ratio combining (MRC). If such a receive filter is used heuris-
tically in the presence of jamming, the correlation with the jamming channel (in the sense
that E{gHĥ|sj} = Mα2βj) results in an amplification of the jamming signal. This leads to a
degradation of the system performance [4], known as jamming pilot contamination. In order to
mitigate this effect, we propose to design the receive filter based on both h and g. However,
since h and g are not available at the BS, we construct receive filters using their estimates
instead.
Recall that there is (at least) one unused pilot sequence, preserved in the system, which is
orthogonal to the user’s pilot su. By projecting the received pilot signal Yt onto this unused
pilot sequence, the user’s pilot signal is eliminated, leaving only the jamming signal (and noise).
The resulting signal is
yj = Yts
∗
u =
√
τpjs
T
j s
∗
ug +Nts
∗
u, (10)
where su is the unused pilot sequence, satisfying s
T
u s
∗
u = 0. An estimate of the jamming channel
g can be obtained as
ĝ = ηjyj , α3g + n2, (11)
9where ηj =
1√
pjβj+σ2
, α3 = ηj
√
τpjs
T
j s
∗
u, and n2 ∼ CN (0, η2j σ2IM). We note that the quality of
the jamming channel estimate ĝ depends on the value of |sTj s∗u|. It can happen that |sTj s∗u| = 0,
but the probability is zero since sj is a continuous random vector, which is uniformly distributed
over the unit sphere. Moreover, when there are more than one unused pilot sequence, one can
improve the quality of the jamming channel estimate ĝ by selecting the unused pilot sequence,
which maximizes |sTj s∗u| or combining all of them. In this paper, we pick one unused pilot at
random, to focus on the basic behaviors, and leave potential improvements for future work.
B. Jamming-Resistant Receiver
Based on the estimates ĥ and ĝ, we now construct a jamming-resistant receiver, which is
inspired by the RZF receiver [19]. Accordingly, we propose the following RZF receiver3
a = aRZF =
(
ĝĝH + µIM
)−1
ĥ, (12)
where µ ≥ 0 is the regularization factor, determining the amount of interference power remaining
at the receiver [19]. By adjusting µ, one can balance between the targets of amplifying the desired
signal and mitigating the undesired jamming signal to optimize the overall system performance.
In the following, we consider two common examples of the RZF receiver.
1) MMSE-type receiver: First, we consider the MMSE receive filter, which is optimal when
the receiver has perfect channel state information. Let us rewrite the received signal in (2) as
yd =
√
quĥxu +
√
qjĝxj +
√
queuxu +
√
qjejxj + nd,
where eu , h − ĥ and ej , g − ĝ are the desired and jamming channel estimation errors,
respectively. By treating w ,
√
queuxu +
√
qjejxj + nd as equivalent uncorrelated additive
Gaussian noise, an MMSE-type receive filter can be obtained as
aMMSE =
(
ĝĝH +
1
qj
Ψ
)−1
ĥ, (13)
3Conventionally, the RZF receiver is constructed based on the exact channels h and g, in which case it becomes (hhH +
ggH+µIM )
−1[h g]. Since we are not interested in the jamming signal, we only need the first column: (hhH+ggH+µIM )
−1h
which is proportional to (ggH +µIM )
−1h due to the matrix inversion lemma [20]. From this expression, with a slightly abuse
of definition, we call the receive filter in (12) an RZF receiver under imperfect channel knowledge.
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where Ψ is the covariance matrix of the signal associated with estimation errors plus noise, i.e.,
Ψ = E{wwH} = σ2eIM . (14)
Since sj is unknown, the expectation in (14) is over all random variables including sj. Therefore,
the equivalent noise variance σ2e is given by
σ2e = quβu(1− ηu
√
τpu) + qj(βj(1 + η
2
j pj) + η
2
j σ
2) + σ2.
The MMSE-type receive filter in (13) corresponds to an RZF receive filter with µ = σ2e/qj. Note
that our setup includes the jamming pilot contamination, which makes the equivalent noise w
correlated with the estimated channels ĥ and ĝ. The receive filter in (13) is thus not the true
MMSE filter, i.e., aMMSE may not be optimal in the conventional sense. That is why we call
aMMSE an “MMSE-type” receive filter.
2) ZF-type receiver: Motivated by the fact that the jamming signal is a main source of
limitation in massive MIMO, we consider a receiver that focuses on nulling the jamming signal,
i.e., a ZF-type receiver. We show that aRZF corresponds to a ZF-type receiver when µ→ 0.
Following the matrix inversion lemma [20, Lemma 2], the RZF receiver in (12) can be
expressed as
aRZF =
1
µ
(
IM − ĝĝ
H
µ+ ‖ĝ‖2
)
ĥ. (15)
Since a deterministic scalar factor does not change the performance of a linear receive filter (it
appears in all terms in the SINR), the RZF receiver in (15) is equivalent to
a˜RZF =
(
IM − ĝĝ
H
µ+ ‖ĝ‖2
)
ĥ. (16)
Therefore, when µ→ 0 the RZF receiver aRZF becomes a ZF-type receiver aZF, which can be
expressed as
aZF =
(
IM − ĝĝ
H
‖ĝ‖2
)
ĥ. (17)
Note that we have used the projection-matrix expression for ZF, which is equivalent to using
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pseudo-inverses. Due to the imperfect channel estimation, the linear receiver in (17) is not an
exact ZF receiver since ĝHaZF = 0 but g
HaZF is generally non-zero. Thus, we call the linear
receiver in (17) a “ZF-type” receiver.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the different proposed receivers and derive the
optimal regularization factor for the RZF receiver. The performance of the proposed receivers
are also analyzed for systems with extremely strong jammers.
A. Large-scale Approximations
First of all, let us analyze the effective SINR, which is achieved by the RZF receiver. By
exploiting the asymptotic properties of massive MIMO, we can obtain a closed-form large-scale
approximation of the effective SINR ρ, i.e., an approximation of the effective SINR which almost
surely (a.s.) converges to its true value when the number of antennas M tends to infinity. To this
end, we use the following notation: for two sequences f1[M ] and f2[M ], we write f1[M ] ≍ f2[M ]
to denote that f1[M ] − f2[M ] a.s.−−−−→
M→∞
0, where “
a.s.−−−−→
M→∞
0” denotes a.s. convergence. We now
obtain the following large-scale approximation.
Theorem 1. Assume that the RZF receiver a = aMMSE is used for a fixed µ, then a large-scale
approximation of the effective SINR in (6) can be obtained as ρ ≍ ρRZF, where ρRZF is given by
ρRZF =
Mτpuquβ
2
u
τpuquβ2u +Mτpjqjδ1β
2
j
(
µ/M+η2
j
σ2
µ/M+η2
j
γj
)2
+ σ2(τpuβu + σ2 + τpjδ1βj
τpjδ2η
4
j
σ2βj+(µ/M+η
2
j
σ2)2
(µ/M+η2
j
γj)2
)
,
(18)
δ1 = |sTj s∗u|2, δ2 = |sTj s∗u|2, and γj = τpjδ2βj + σ2.
Proof. When the RZF receiver is used, the power terms of the effective SINR in (6) can be
calculated as follows.
· The desired signal term qu|E{aHh|sj}|2
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Let us consider
aHh
M
=
ĥH
M
(
ĝĝH + µIM
)−1
h
=
ĥH
M
1
µ
(
IM − ĝĝ
H
µ+ ‖ĝ‖2
)
h
=
1
µ
ĥHh
M
− µ
ĥH ĝ
M
ĝHh
M
µ
M
+ ‖ĝ‖
2
M
, (19)
where the second equality follows from the matrix inversion lemma. Since h, g, and (n1, n2) are
independent, due to the law of large number, we have the following large-scale approximations
ĥHh
M
=
(α1h+ α2g + n1)
Hh
M
≍ α1βu, (20)
ĥH ĝ
M
=
(α1h+ α2g + n1)
H(α3g + n2)
M
≍ α∗2α3βj, (21)
ĝHh
M
=
(α3g + n2)
Hh
M
≍ 0, (22)
‖ĝ‖2
M
≍ ηjγj, (23)
µ
M
≍ 0. (24)
Thus, it follows that a
Hh
M
≍ 1
µ
α1βu and since a.s. convergence implies convergence in mean we
further have
qu|E{aHh|sj}|2
M2
≍ qu
µ2
α21β
2
u. (25)
· The signal gain uncertainty term quvar{aHh|sj}
By using the large-scale approximations in (19), (21), (22), and (23) we have
aHh
M
≍ α1
µ
hHh
M
.
Thus,
var
{
aHh
M
∣∣∣∣sj} ≍ α21µ2M2var{hHh|sj}
=
α21
µ2M2
Mβ2u =
α21
µ2M
β2u.
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Therefore,
quvar{aHh|sj}
M2
≍ qu
Mµ2
α21β
2
u. (26)
· The jamming term qjE{|aHg|2|sj}
By following similar steps as for the desired signal term, we have
aHg
M
≍ 1
µ
α∗2βj
µ/M + η2j σ
2
µ/M + η2j γj
and
qjE{|aHg|2|sj}
M2
≍ qj
µ2
(
µ/M + η2j σ
2
µ/M + η2j γj
)2
|α2|2β2j . (27)
· The noise term σ2E{‖a‖2|sj}
Once again, by following similar steps as for the desired signal term, when M →∞ we have
σ2E{‖a‖2|sj}
M2
≍ σ
2
Mµ2
(
α21βu + η
2
uσ
2 + |α2|2βj
|α3|2η2j σ2βj + (µ/M + η2j σ2)2
(µ/M + η2j γj)
2
)
. (28)
Substituting (25), (26), (27), and (28) into (6), we obtain a large-scale approximation of ρ as
ρ ≍ ρRZF =
Mquα
2
1β
2
u
quα21β
2
u +Mqj
(
µ/M+η2
j
σ2
µ/M+η2
j
γj
)2
|α2|2β2j + σ2
(
α21βu + η
2
uσ
2 + |α2|2βj |α3|
2η2
j
σ2βj+(µ/M+η
2
j
σ2)2
(µ/M+η2
j
γj)2
) .
(29)
By denoting δ1 = |sTj s∗u|2, δ2 = |sTj s∗u|2 and using the fact that α21 = η2uτpu, |α2|2 = η2uτpjδ1,
|α3|2 = η2j τpjδ2, the effective SINR in (29) can be rewritten as in (18). This completes the proof
for Theorem 1.
From Theorem 1 and its proof, we revisit our discussions in the end of Section II regarding
to the impact of different power terms in the effective SINR. We can see that when M is large,
the power terms associated with the channel uncertainty and additive noise scale with M and
are negligible compared to the desired signal term and the jamming term, which scale with M2.
Moreover, as we have discussed in Remark 1, the effective SINR ρRZF is dependent on
14
δ1 = |sTj s∗u|2 and δ2 = |sTj s∗u|2. Although sj is unknown a priori, the BS can estimate δ1 and
δ2 very accurately thanks to the asymptotic properties of massive MIMO. Following from (7),
(10), and the law of large number, we have
1
M
‖yu‖2 ≍ τpuβu + τpjβjδ1 + σ2,
1
M
‖yj‖2 ≍ τpjβjδ2 + σ2.
(30)
Therefore, the BS can estimate δ1 and δ2 as δ̂1 =
1
τpjβj
(
‖yu‖2
M
− τpuβu − σ2
)
,
δ̂2 =
1
τpjβj
(
‖yj‖2
M
− σ2
)
.
(31)
When M is large, which is the case in massive MIMO, the estimates in (31) are very close
to the true values of δ1 and δ2. Thus, the BS can evaluate the effective SINR ρRZF with high
accuracy, as we will show in the numerical analysis (in Section VI).
A closed-form large-scale approximation of the effective SINR achieved by the MMSE-type
receiver can be obtained from Theorem 1 by setting µ = σ
2
e
qj
in (18), which gives ρ ≍ ρMMSE,
where ρMMSE is given by
ρMMSE =
Mτpuquβ
2
u
τpuquβ2u +Mτpjqjδ1β
2
j
(
σ2e /(Mqj)+η
2
j
σ2
σ2e/(Mqj)+η
2
j
γj
)2
+ σ2
(
τpuβu + σ2 + τpjδ1βj
τpjδ2η
4
j
σ2βj+(σ2e /(Mqj)+η
2
j
σ2)2
(σ2e /(Mqj)+η
2
j
γj)2
) .
(32)
Similarly, a closed-form large-scale approximation of the effective SINR achieved by the ZF-type
receiver can be obtained as ρ ≍ ρZF, where ρZF is given by
ρZF =
Mτpuquβ
2
u
τpuquβ2u +Mτpjqjδ1β
2
j
σ4
γ2
j
+ σ2(τpuβu + σ2 + τpjδ1βj
σ2
γj
)
. (33)
Furthermore, when the number of antennas M tends to infinity, both the effective SINRs with
MMSE-type and ZF-type receive filters converge to the same finite limit. Let us call this the
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asymptotic effective SINR ρasy, then we have
lim
M→∞
ρMMSE = lim
M→∞
ρZF = lim
M→∞
ρRZF , ρasy =
γ2j
δ1σ4
puquβ
2
u
pjqjβ2j
. (34)
This implies that when the number of antennas M grows large, the effective SINR with the
RZF receiver for any regularization factor µ converges to a finite limit, which is independent
of µ. Note that, besides the expected “signal-to-jamming ratio” term puquβ
2
u
pjqjβ
2
j
[9], the asymptotic
effective SINR contains the scaling factor
γ2j
δ1σ4
=
(τpjδ2βj + σ
2)2
δ1σ4
, (35)
which is resulted from the proposed jamming channel estimation scheme. It is interesting to see
that this scaling factor increases with the jamming pilot power pj, i.e., the benefit of the proposed
scheme is greater with stronger jamming pilot signal. Moreover, after some simple mathematical
manipulations it can be shown that the asymptotic effective SINR ρasy is an increasing function
w.r.t. pj for pj >
σ4
τ2β2
j
δ22
. In other words, the achievable rate increases with the jamming pilot power
pj when pj is higher than a certain level. Intuitively, when pj is large enough, the improvement
in the estimation quality of jamming channel, resulted from the increase of pj, overcomes the
degradation in estimation quality of the legitimate channel. Therefore, it is expected that the
proposed receivers can work well or even better with stronger jamming pilot signal.
Remark 2. Although we focus on a single user setup, the proposed scheme can be generalized
to having multiple users. Indeed, in a system with multiple users, the effective SINR of user k
will be similar to the effective SINR in (6) with an additional inter-user interference term in
the denominator. This additional term can be written as
∑
i 6=k qiE{|aHk hi|2|sj}, where qi, ai,
and hi are the data transmit power, receiver filter, and channel gain of user i. Assume that the
pilot sequences assigned to the users are orthogonal and ak is designed as in (12) (by setting
h = hk), then ak is independent of hi for all i 6= k. Therefore, 1M2
∑
i 6=k qiE{|aHk hi|2|sj} ≍ 0.
In other words, the proposed receiver is robust against inter-user interference when M → ∞
and can also be applied for a multiple users setup.
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B. Optimal RZF Receiver
For a finite number of antennas M , the performance of the proposed RZF receiver highly
depends on the regularization factor µ. In the following, we derive the optimal µ, which maximize
the effective SINR ρRZF, i.e., we investigate the optimal RZF receiver. Using the results from
Theorem 1, we can prove the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume that the RZF receiver a = aRZF is used. The effective SINR ρRZF in (18)
approaches its maximum when µ→ 0, i.e., the ZF-type receiver is the optimal RZF receiver.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Corollary 1 shows that in massive MIMO systems with jamming attacks, the simple ZF-type
receiver outperforms other RZF receivers with non-zero µ, including the MMSE-type receiver.
This is a surprising result, but understandable since the MMSE-type receiver is not an optimal
receiver, as discussed in Section III-B1. As shown in [19], the regularization factor µ determines
the amount of interference (or jamming in our case) remaining at the receiver as compared to
the additive noise. Moreover, jamming pilot contamination, resulting in coherent combining of
the jamming signal is a main source of limitation in massive MIMO. Therefore, a favorable
approach to deal with jamming attacks in massive MIMO is to perform ZF processing and focus
on suppressing the jamming signal.
C. Extremely Strong Jamming
Next, we investigate the performance of the proposed receivers for a system with extremely
strong jamming, where the jamming powers grow without bound. Based on the results from
Theorem 1, we can prove the following.
Corollary 2. Assume that the RZF receiver a = aRZF is used. For pj = λqj →∞, where λ is a
finite strictly positive constant, we have:
• For µ > 0: ρRZF → 0.
• For µ = 0: ρRZF = ρZF → Mτpuquβ2u
τpuquβ2u+
Mδ1σ
4
λτδ2
2
+σ2(τpuβu+σ2+
δ1
δ2
σ2)
> 0.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B.
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In Corollary 2, we only consider cases when the power of the jamming pilot signal pj grows
jointly with the power of the jamming data signal qj. The results for the other trivial cases, i.e.,
(pj = const., qj →∞) and (pj →∞, qj = const.) can be obtained as follows:
• If pj = const., qj →∞: ρRZF converges to zero for all values of µ.
• If pj → ∞, qj = const.: ρRZF converges to zero for µ > 0 and ρRZF = ρZF converges to a
non-zero finite value for µ = 0.
Corollary 2 implies that the proposed ZF-type receiver works well even under extremely strong
jamming, as long as the power pj of the jamming pilot signal increases jointly with the power qj
of the jamming data signal. This is consistent with our analysis in Section IV-A, which indicated
that the proposed scheme can work well and even better with stronger jamming pilot signal. This
behavior is due to the fact that our proposed receivers are constructed based on the jamming
channel estimate ĝ, which is obtained from an empty pilot, and its quality is improved when the
jamming pilot power pj increases. We can thus reject the jamming better and better as pj →∞,
but the jamming still remains since also qj →∞.
V. POWER ALLOCATION
In this section, we will show how the legitimate user should allocate its power between the
pilot phase and data transmission phase to maximize the achievable rate, in the presence of
jamming. We consider two optimization approaches, which use the asymptotic effective SINR
ρasy and the ZF-type effective SINR ρZF as the objective functions for the cases of infinite and
finite number of antennas, respectively.
A. Power Allocation for Infinite M
First, we derive the optimal power allocation for the case with an infinite number of antennas.
Assuming that the jamming transmit powers (pu, qu) are fixed, the legitimate user aims to
maximize ρasy by optimally allocating its transmit powers (pu, qu) during the pilot phase and
data transmission phase. We assume that the transmit powers of the legitimate user satisfy
τpu + (T − τ)qu ≤ TPu, (36)
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where Pu is the average power constraint of the legitimate user. Given the power constraint in
(36), we consider the asymptotically optimal power allocation problem, expressed as
maximize
pu,qu
ρasy (37)
subject to τpu + (T − τ)qu ≤ TPu,
pu ≥ 0, qu ≥ 0.
Proposition 1. The solution to (37) is given by p
asy
opt =
T
2τ
Pu,
qasyopt =
T
2(T−τ)Pu.
(38)
Proof. Following from (34), the objective function ρasy in (37) can be rewritten as
ρasy =
(τpjδ2βj + σ
2)2β2u
pjqjδ1σ4β2j
puqu. (39)
We note that ρasy is a linear function of the multiplication puqu. Therefore, the optimization
problem (37) is equivalent to
maximize
pu,qu
puqu (40)
subject to τpu + (T − τ)qu ≤ TPu,
pu ≥ 0, qu ≥ 0.
Since puqu is an increasing function w.r.t. pu and qu, the optimal solution is achieved with
equality in the first constraint, i.e., pu = (TPu− (T − τ)qu)/τ . Substituting this equality into the
objective function in (40), we achieve an equivalent unconstrained optimization problem with a
second-order polynomial objective function and a single variable qu, which can be easily solved
to obtain (38).
Proposition 1 shows that, for the given average power budget Pu and coherence interval T , the
asymptotic optimal power allocation (pasyopt, p
asy
opt) depends only on the pilot length τ . Moreover,
we note that τpasyopt = (T−τ)pasyopt = TPu/2. Intuitively, it is optimal to equally divide the transmit
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energy for the pilot and data transmission phases when the number of antennas is very large
(M →∞). This result confirms the importance of the channel estimation in massive MIMO.
The optimal power allocation problem in (37) is designed for a system with infinite number of
antennas. However, as it will be shown in the numerical analysis, the performance loss is relative
small when the asymptotic optimal power allocation in (38) is employed for a system with a
finite number of antennas. Therefore, the power allocation in (38) can be applied as a simple
heuristic power allocation that does not depend on the jammer’s powers and signal structure.
B. Power Allocation for Finite M
In the following, we consider the power allocation that maximizes the achievable rate for a
system with finite number of antennas. We have shown in Section IV that the ZF-type receiver
is the optimal RZF receiver. Thus, we focus on optimizing the power allocation for a system
with the ZF-type receiver. Accordingly, the optimal power allocation problem can be expressed
as
maximize
pu,qu
ρZF (41)
subject to τpu + (T − τ)qu ≤ TPu,
pu ≥ 0, qu ≥ 0.
The solution for the optimization problem (41) is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The solution to (41) is given by popt =
√
ν2+νβuσ2TPu−ν
τβuσ2
,
qopt =
√
ν+βuσ2TPu(
√
ν+βuσ2TPu−√ν)
(T−τ)βuσ2 ,
(42)
where
ν =
τpjβjδ1σ
4
τpjδ2βj + σ2
(
Mqjβj
τpjδ2βj + σ2
+ 1
)
+ σ4. (43)
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Proof. Following from (33), the objective function ρZF in (41) can be rewritten as
ρZF =
Mτβ2upuqu
τβ2upuqu + τβuσ
2pu + ν
, (44)
where ν is defined in (43). Therefore, the optimal power allocation problem (33) is equivalent
to
maximize
pu,qu
puqu
τβ2upuqu + τβuσ
2pu + ν
(45)
subject to τpu + (T − τ)qu ≤ TPu,
pu ≥ 0, qu ≥ 0.
By dividing both the numerator and denominator of the objective function in (45) by puqu, an
equivalent optimization problem of (45) is obtained as
minimize
pu,qu
1
qu
(
τβuσ
2 +
ν
pu
)
(46)
subject to τpu + (T − τ)qu ≤ TPu,
pu ≥ 0, qu ≥ 0.
We note that the objective function of the optimization problem in (46) is a decreasing function
w.r.t. pu and qu. The optimal solution is achieved when having equality in the first constraint,
i.e., pu = (TPu− (T − τ)qu)/τ . Substituting this equality into the objective function in (46), we
achieve an equivalent optimization problem with single variable qu, which is convex. Solving
this equivalent optimization problem using the Lagrangian multiplier method and Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions [21], we obtain the optimal power allocation in (42).
It is worth noting that the parameter ν is dependent on δ1 = |sTj s∗u|2 and δ2 = |sTj s∗u|2.
Therefore, in order to utilize the optimal power allocation in (42), the legitimate user needs to
know the jamming sequence sj or at least the correlation of the jamming sequence with the pilot
sequences, i.e., |sTj s∗u|2 and |sTj s∗u|2. However, the jamming sequence sj is typically unknown at
the legitimate user. Therefore, we consider the achievable rate achieved by the power allocation
in (42) as an upper bound that can be achieved with perfect knowledge of sj.
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Assuming that sj is unknown, we propose a sub-optimal power allocation solution motivated
from the solution in (42). For instance, by replacing δ1 and δ2 with their mean values, a sub-
optimal power allocation solution for the case of finite number of antennas can be used as psubopt =
√
ν˜2+ν˜βuσ2TPu−ν˜
τβuσ2
,
qsubopt =
√
ν˜+βuσ2TPu(
√
ν˜+βuσ2TPu−
√
ν˜)
(T−τ)βuσ2 ,
(47)
where ν˜ is an approximation of the parameter ν, given by
ν˜ =
τpjβjE{δ1}σ4
τpjE{δ2}βj + σ2
(
Mqjβj
τpjE{δ2}βj + σ2 + 1
)
+ σ4 =
pjβjσ
4
pjβj + σ2
(
Mqjβj
pjβj + σ2
+ 1
)
+ σ4. (48)
In (48) the second equality follows from the assumption that sj ∈ Cτ×1 is uniformly distributed
over the unit sphere, which gives E{δ1} = E{|sTj s∗u|2} = 1/τ and E{δ2} = E{|sTj s∗u|2} = 1/τ
[22].
Remark 3. From the results in (38) and (47), some interesting observations can be made.
(i) The sub-optimal power allocation in (47) is consistent with the asymptotic optimal power
allocation in (38). Indeed, after some simple mathematical manipulations, one can show
that (psubopt , q
sub
opt ) converge to (p
asy
opt, q
asy
opt) when M →∞.
(ii) Unlike the asymptotically optimal power allocation in (38), the sub-optimal power allocation
(psubopt , q
sub
opt ) depends on the number of antennas M and the jamming powers pj, qj. Therefore,
one can expect a better performance from the sub-optimal power allocation, especially when
the number of antennas M is large but finite.
(iii) A better approximation of ν can be achieved by using the instantaneous estimates of δ1
and δ2 from (31) instead of their mean values, as done in ν˜. However, the estimates from
(31) are only available after the pilot phase. Therefore, we can not use them to facilitate a
power allocation, which needs to be pre-determined before the pilot phase.
VI. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance of different linear receivers, including
the proposed jamming-resistant receivers, in term of the average achievable rates. The average in
(5) is taken over 10000 realizations of sj. We consider a coherence block of T = 200 symbols,
22
20 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
M
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
A
ch
ie
va
b
le
ra
te
(b
it
s/
s/
H
z)
τ = 3, βu = βj = 1, pu = qu = pj = qj
ZF-type, anal.
ZF-type, simul.
MMSE-type, anal.
MMSE-type, simul.
Conv. MRC, simul.
10dB
5dB
0dB
0 - 10dB
Fig. 2. Achievable rates for different linear receivers. The solid curves (with label “anal.”) represent the analysis results. The
marked curves (with label “simul.”) represent the simulation results.
τ = 3, βu = βu = 1, and σ
2 = 1. For comparison, we also include the rate achieved by the
conventional MRC receiver amrc = ĥ, defined in (9), which does not use the estimate ĝ [9].
A. Performance with Different Linear Receivers
First, we compare the performance of the different linear receivers. Fig. 2 shows the achievable
rates versus the number of antennas at the BS. We assume that pu = qu = pj = qj = SNR and
consider different values of SNR = 0 dB, 5 dB, 10 dB. As expected, the proposed receive
filters based on the jamming channel estimate can remarkably improve the system performance,
as compared to the MRC receiver. The achievable rates calculated based on the analysis in
Theorem 1 (curves with “anal.”) are close to the Monte-Carlo simulations (curves with “simul.”),
and will be asymptotically tight as M → ∞. Moreover, we can see that the simple ZF-type
receive filter works particularly well and outperforms the MMSE-type receive filter. This behavior
confirms the results from Corollary 1 and shows that in massive MIMO, when the jamming effect
is critical, a favorable receiver solution is to focus on nulling the jamming signal.
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Fig. 3. Achievable rates for varying jamming powers pj, qj.
B. Impact of Jamming Powers
Next, we exemplify the effect of the jamming powers on the system performance. We consider
two scenarios with extremely strong jamming. In the first scenario (Fig. 3), we fix the legitimate
user’s transmit powers as pu = qu = 5dB, and increase both the jammer’s transmit powers
pj and qj from −20 dB to 40 dB. In the second scenario (Fig. 4), we fix the legitimate user’s
transmit powers and the jamming data power as pu = qu = qj = 5dB, and increase only the
jamming pilot power pj.
Fig. 3 illustrates the achievable rates in the first scenario, for different values of the jamming
attack powers pj = qj. The achievable rates with the conventional MRC and MMSE-type
receivers approach zero when pj, qj → ∞. However, the ZF-type receiver still performs well
under strong jamming attacks. Moreover, we can see that the achievable rate with the ZF-type
receiver converges to a non-zero value when the jamming data power qj tends to infinity, as long
as the jamming pilot power pj grows proportionally with qj.
Fig. 4 shows the achievable rates according to the jamming pilot power pj, in the second
scenario with fixed jamming data power. As expected, the achievable rate with the conventional
MRC receiver decreases with the increase of the jamming powers. However, the proposed
scheme, especially with the ZF-type receiver, still works well with strong jamming attacks.
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Fig. 4. Achievable rates for varying jamming pilot power pj.
Moreover, it is interesting to see that the ZF-type receiver works better under stronger jamming
pilot attacks. We note that there are gaps between our approximate results and the simulation
results when pj is very small. This is because in our large-scale approximation, we omit some
small terms, which a.s. converge to zero when M →∞, but still are significant when pj is small
and M is finite. The gaps will disappear when M →∞.
The results in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 are consistent with our analysis in Section IV-C and can
be explained by the fact that the proposed receive filters are constructed using the estimates
of both the legitimate channel h and the jamming channel g. When the jamming pilot power
pj increases, it does not only degrade the quality of the legitimate channel estimation but also
improves the estimation quality of the jamming channel. Thus, the proposed receive filters can
improve the system performance if the improvement in the estimation quality of ĝ overcomes
the degradation in the estimation quality of ĥ.
C. Impact of Power Allocation
Next, we evaluate the impact of different power allocations on the system performance. Fig. 5
illustrates the achievable rates for varying power ratios pu/qu of the legitimate user. We assume
that the average power Pu and the jamming powers are fixed as Pu = pj = qj = 5dB. It is
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Fig. 5. Achievable rates for varying power ratios pu/qu. The dotted curve (with label “M → ∞”) represents the asymptotically
achievable rate as M → ∞. The other curves are the achievable rates for M = 100.
observed that the achievable rates have their peak values at certain ratios of pu/qu. In other
words, one has to balance between the powers spent by the pilot and data signals to achieve the
best transmission rates. Moreover, we can see that the offsets between the asymptotic optimal
power ratio (corresponding to the peak value of the asymptotic achievable rate with M → ∞)
and the optimal power ratios for finite M (corresponding to the peak values of the achievable
rates for MMSE-type and ZF-type receivers with M = 100) are relatively small. It is thus
expected that the asymptotically optimal power allocation can be employed as a simple heuristic
power allocation for systems with large but finite number of antennas M .
In Fig. 6, we plot the achievable rates using different power allocations. All the achievable
rates are achieved by the ZF-type receiver, except the one with the conventional MRC receiver,
which is included for the comparison. In this figure, the “upper bound” curves are the achievable
rate upper bounds, which are obtained by the optimal power allocation in (42). We can see that
the achievable rate increases remarkably when using the simple asymptotically optimal power
allocation in (38). Additionally, the achievable rate achieved by the proposed sub-optimal power
allocation in (47) is very close to the achievable rate upper bound.
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Fig. 6. Achievable rates with different power allocations.
D. Accuracies of the Estimates δ̂1 and δ̂2
Lastly, we numerically evaluate the accuracies of the estimations for δ̂1 and δ̂2 in (31). We
consider pj = qj = 5dB and pu = qu = 0dB, 5 dB, 10 dB. In the upper sub-figure of Fig. 7,
we plot the normalized mean square errors (NMSEs) of the estimations in (31), i.e.,
E{|δ̂i−δi|2}
E{|δi|2} ,
i = 1, 2. In the lower sub-figure of Fig. 7, we show the achievable rates, which are calculated
based on the exact values of (δ1, δ2) (the curves with label “anal.”) and based on the estimates
(δ̂1, δ̂2) (the curves with label “est.”).
We can see that the NMSEs are very small and approach zero when M tends to infinity.
The estimation for δ2 is especially good and independent of pu since δ̂2 is not impacted by the
desired pilot signal. Fig. 7 also shows that the achievable rates resulted from the estimations in
(31) match very well with the actual achievable rates. Therefore, it is expected that the system
can realize the achievable rate in (5) without the perfect knowledge of sj.
VII. CONCLUSION
A new jamming-resistant receiver approach has been proposed to enhance the robustness of the
massive MIMO uplink against jamming attacks. By exploiting purposely unused pilot sequences,
the jamming channel can be estimated using the received pilot signal. The results show that
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Fig. 7. Normalized mean square errors of the estimations in (31) (in upper sub-figure) and the corresponding achievable rates
comparison (in the lower sub-figure).
the proposed receive filters, which were constructed using the jamming channel estimate, can
greatly reduce the effect of jamming attacks and improve the system performance. Moreover,
the proposed scheme still works well, or even better, when the jamming powers increase. Due
to the critical effect of jamming signal, a ZF-type receive filter, which focuses on nulling the
jamming signal is a favorable approach for massive MIMO with jamming. We have also shown
that judicious power allocations can substantially improve the performance of the proposed
receivers.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
In order to prove Corollary 1, we need to show that
ρZF ≥ ρRZF, ∀µ ≥ 0. (49)
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Let us consider
Mτpuquβ
2
u
(
1
ρRZF
− 1
ρZF
)
= Mτpjqjδ1β
2
j
((
µ/M + η2j σ
2
µ/M + η2j γj
)2
− σ
4
γ2j
)
+τpjδ1βjσ
2
(
τpjδ2η
4
j σ
2βj + (µ/M + η
2
j σ
2)2
(µ/M + η2j γj)
2
− σ
2
γj
)
. (50)
Using the fact that γj = τpjδ2βj + σ
2, we can rewrite (50) as
Mquα
2
1β
2
u
(
1
ρRZF
− 1
ρZF
)
= τpjqjδ1β
2
j µ
γj − σ2
µ/M + η2j γj
(
µ/M + η2j σ
2
µ/M + η2j γj
+
σ2
γj
)
+τpjδ1βjσ
2γj − σ2
γj
(
µ/M
µ/M + η2j γj
)2
. (51)
The right-hand side of (51) is non-negative since γj = τpjδ2βj + σ
2 ≥ σ2. Therefore, we have
ρZF ≥ ρRZF for all µ ≥ 0. Thus, the effective SINR ρRZF approaches its maximum when µ→ 0.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
The proof for Corollary 2 consists of two parts.
A. ρRZF converges to 0 when µ > 0 and pj = λqj →∞:
Let us consider the second term in the denominator of (18). Since γj = τpjδ2βj + σ
2 and
ηj =
1√
pjβj + σ2
,
we have (
µ/M + η2j σ
2
µ/M + η2j γj
)2
→ µ
2
(µ2 +Mτδ2βj)2
, for pj = λqj →∞
and
Mτpjqjδ1β
2
j
(
µ/M + η2j σ
2
µ/M + η2j γj
)2
→∞, for pj = λqj →∞.
Therefore,
ρRZF → 0, for µ > 0 and pj = λqj →∞.
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B. ρRZF converges to a non-zero finite value when µ = 0 and pj = λqj →∞:
When µ = 0, we have ρRZF = ρZF. Let us consider the second and last terms in the
denominator of (33), which are dependent on pj and qj. We have
Mτpjqjδ1β
2
j
σ4
γ2j
= Mτpjqjδ1β
2
j
σ4
(τpjδ2βj + σ2)2
→ Mδ1σ
4
λτδ22
, for pj = λqj →∞
and
τpjδ1βj
σ2
γj
= τpjδ1βj
σ2
τpjδ2βj + σ2
→ δ1
δ2
σ2, for pj = λqj →∞.
Therefore, we have
ρZF → Mτpuquβ
2
u
τpuquβ2u +
Mδ1σ4
λτδ22
+ σ2(τpuβu + σ2 +
δ1
δ2
σ2)
> 0, for pj = λqj →∞.
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